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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-2514 
_____________ 
 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
   Appellant 
                       
v. 
 
CITY OF LONG BRANCH 
 
_____________ 
 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the  
District of New Jersey 
(D. N.J. No. 3-15-cv-01081) 
District Judge:  Honorable Michael A. Shipp 
 
_____________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 15, 2016 
 
Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES, and FUENTES, Circuit 
Judges. 
 
(Filed: August 2, 2017)                    
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Emery J. Mishky 
Margolis Edelstein 
400 Connell Drive, Suite 5400 
Berkeley Heights, N.J. 07922 
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_____________ 
 
OPINION  
_____________ 
 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 
 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”) filed a subpoena enforcement action against the 
City of Long Branch in furtherance of its efforts to obtain 
documents pertaining to a charge of discrimination.  A 
Magistrate Judge issued an order to enforce the subpoena, in 
part, and the EEOC appealed the order to the District Court.  
The District Court affirmed the Magistrate Judge’s order.  
Before us is the EEOC’s appeal from the District Court’s 
order. 
  
 The EEOC raises two substantive issues on appeal, the 
first regarding the exhaustion of administrative remedies and 
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the second regarding the disclosure to the charging party of 
other employees’ disciplinary and related records.  However, 
our review of the record reveals a significant procedural 
defect pertaining to the treatment of the motion to enforce 
under the Federal Magistrates Act.  This error, in light of the 
facts of this case, precludes us from reaching the merits of the 
EEOC’s arguments.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
vacate the order of the District Court and remand.   
 
I. 
 
 On or about February 7, 2013, Lieutenant Lyndon 
Johnson (“Lt. Johnson”) of the Long Branch Police 
Department filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC 
against the City of Long Branch (“Long Branch”).  Lt. 
Johnson is an African-American man.  He charged that his 
employer discriminated against him on the basis of race, in 
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”), by subjecting him “to 
different and harsher disciplinary measures than similarly 
situated white colleagues who committed the same or similar 
. . . infractions.”  Appendix (“App.”) 32.  On August 19, 
2013, the EEOC served Long Branch with a notice to charge.  
On December 30, 2013, the EEOC requested “all disciplinary 
records” for Lt. Johnson and six Caucasian comparator 
officers.  App. 19, 33.  Long Branch responded by letter to 
the EEOC that it was preparing the requested materials but 
that it would not produce the materials unless the EEOC 
executed a confidentiality agreement wherein it would agree 
to not reveal “confidential” materials, including the personnel 
files of the comparators, to anyone, including Lt. Johnson.  
App. 54.  The EEOC refused to execute such an agreement. 
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 The EEOC served a subpoena on Long Branch by 
email and certified mail on July 23, 2014.  The subpoena 
requested “a copy of any and all documents which refer to or 
address the disciplinary records” for Lt. Johnson and the six 
comparators.  App. 63.  Long Branch, in response, sent the 
EEOC a document titled “Notice of Motion to Quash 
Subpoena.”  App. 68.  The document had a caption for the 
Superior Court of New Jersey Department of Law and Public 
Safety Division on Civil Rights.    The EEOC received this 
document on August 7, 2014.  The notice reiterated Long 
Branch’s position that it would not disclose the requested 
documents without an executed confidentiality agreement.  
The document reads, in part: 
 
7. The subpoena seeks confidential 
disciplinary records of various Officers, who 
have no involvement in the claimant’s matter, 
and this is contrary to the Policy and Procedures 
of Internal Affairs which has strict requirements 
for release of such records. 
8. As previously stated, the respondent is 
not in privy to disclose the subpoenaed records 
unless EEOC meets the criteria as set-forth in 
the Policy and Procedures, or in the alternative, 
guarantee[s] Confidential[ity] of these records. 
9. Accordingly, the respondent object[s] to 
the subpoena of these disciplinary records and 
seek[s] to quash the subpoena.  
 
App. 72.   
 
 Section 1601.16(b) of Title 29 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations requires that a person or entity intending not to 
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comply with an EEOC subpoena submit a petition to modify 
or revoke the subpoena to the EEOC’s Director or General 
Counsel within five days after service.  29 C.F.R. § 
1601.16(b)(1).  Long Branch never submitted such a petition.   
 
 On February 10, 2015, the EEOC filed a motion in 
federal district court seeking enforcement of its subpoena.  
The EEOC argued that because Long Branch failed to exhaust 
its administrative remedies by filing a timely petition to 
revoke or modify, it waived its right to object to the 
subpoena.  In addition, the EEOC argued that even if Long 
Branch were not precluded from contesting the subpoena, its 
refusal to turn over the subpoenaed materials was improper. 
 
 A federal Magistrate Judge issued an order enforcing 
the subpoena, in part.  The Magistrate Judge acknowledged 
the EEOC’s exhaustion argument but did not consider 
whether the statute and regulations established an exhaustion 
requirement.  Citing the EEOC’s brief, the Magistrate Judge 
simply observed that “[h]ere, Respondent failed to file a 
timely petition to revoke or modify the EEOC subpoena in 
accordance with regulations, and instead remained steadfast 
in its refusal to produce the records.”  App. 12.  The 
Magistrate Judge then compelled Long Branch to provide the 
requested documents, but required the EEOC to avoid 
disclosure of the comparators’ employment and personnel 
records to Lt. Johnson, reasoning that under EEOC v. 
Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590 (1981), disclosure 
of the comparators’ records to Lt. Johnson would be 
improper.   
 
 The EEOC appealed the Magistrate Judge’s order to 
the District Court, requesting that the District Court “reverse 
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that part of the Order . . . that restricts EEOC’s ability to 
disclose records obtain[ed] during its investigation to the 
charging party or his counsel.”  App. 108.  The EEOC did not 
object to the part of the Magistrate Judge’s order referencing 
exhaustion, and the District Court did not address the issue.  
The District Court affirmed the Magistrate Judge’s order that 
Long Branch turn over the comparators’ employment and 
personnel records and that the EEOC not disclose those files 
to Lt. Johnson.  Like the Magistrate Judge, the District Court 
relied on Associated Dry Goods, holding that “‘[w]ith respect 
to all files other than his own, [the charging party] is a 
stranger.’  Accordingly, the Order’s restriction on the 
disclosure of the comparator’s personnel and employment 
records was not contrary to law.”  App. 8 (alterations in 
original) (citation omitted) (quoting Assoc. Dry Goods, 449 
U.S. at 603).  The EEOC timely appealed. 
 
II. 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(3) and 2000e-9 and 29 U.S.C. § 161(2).  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
 We apply an abuse of discretion standard when 
reviewing a district court’s decision to enforce an 
administrative subpoena.  McLane Co. v. EEOC, 137 S. Ct. 
1159, 1170 (2017), as revised, (Apr. 3, 2017).  “Abuse of 
discretion occurs when ‘the district court’s decision rests 
upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion 
of law or an improper application of law to fact.’”  Chao v. 
Cmty. Tr. Co., 474 F.3d 75, 79 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting NLRB 
v. Frazier, 966 F.2d 812, 815 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
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III. 
 
 The EEOC raises two issues on appeal:  (1) whether 
Long Branch is precluded from contesting the motion to 
enforce because it failed to exhaust its administrative 
remedies (hereinafter, the “exhaustion issue”), and (2) 
whether the EEOC may disclose information from the non-
charging parties’ employment and personnel records to Lt. 
Johnson (hereinafter, the “disclosure issue”).  Despite the 
compelling nature of these issues, we will not reach them 
because of a procedural error committed by the District 
Court:  the District Court erroneously treated the motion to 
enforce that the Magistrate Judge had reviewed as a 
nondispositive motion instead of a dispositive motion.  This is 
a meaningful distinction under the Federal Magistrates Act, 
28 U.S.C. § 631, et seq., as the categorization of motion 
dictates, inter alia, the level of authority with which a 
magistrate judge may act on a motion and the availability and 
standard of review afforded by the District Court and our 
Court.  We will first review the differing treatment of 
nondispositive and dispositive motions under the Act and as 
developed by our jurisprudence.  We will then turn to the 
facts of the instant case.  
 
A. 
 
 The office of magistrate judge was created by the 
Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 631, et seq. (the “Act”) 
to “relieve courts of unnecessary work and to improve access 
to the courts.”  Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Dominick D’Andrea, Inc., 
150 F.3d 245, 250 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Niehaus v. Kan. 
Bar Ass’n, 793 F.2d 1159, 1165 (10th Cir. 1986)).  In this 
Circuit, magistrate judges are highly valued and are vital to 
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the just and efficient resolution of cases filed in the federal 
courts.  See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 
1932, 1938–39 (2015) (“[I]t is no exaggeration to say that 
without the distinguished service of [magistrate and 
bankruptcy judges], the work of the federal court system 
would grind nearly to a halt.”); Peretz v. United States, 501 
U.S. 923, 928 (1991) (“Given the bloated dockets that district 
courts have now come to expect as ordinary, the role of the 
magistrate in today’s federal judicial system is nothing less 
than indispensable.” (quoting Gov’t of the V.I. v. Williams, 
892 F.2d 305, 308 (3d Cir. 1989))). 
 
 In furtherance of this purpose, the Act authorizes 
district court judges to delegate certain matters to magistrate 
judges.  See 28 U.S.C. § 636.  Because magistrate judges are 
not Article III judges, the Act carefully delineates the types of 
matters that may be referred to magistrate judges, so as to 
ensure that “the essential attributes of the judicial power” 
remain in Article III tribunals, N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. 
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 77 (1982) (quoting 
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)).  See Frazier, 966 
F.2d at 816.  Relevant here, the Act authorizes district courts 
to refer nondispositive and dispositive motions to magistrate 
judges.  Unlike a nondispositive motion (such as a discovery 
motion), a motion is dispositive if a decision on the motion 
would effectively determine a claim or defense of a party.  
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), (b)(1); see also In re U.S. 
Healthcare, 159 F.3d 142, 145 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that a 
motion to remand is dispositive because “it preclusively 
determines the important point that there will not be a federal 
forum available to entertain a particular dispute”); Cont’l Cas. 
Co., 150 F.3d at 251 (treating a motion as nondispositive 
because it “did not dispose of the lawsuit or a claim”). 
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1. 
 
 A district court may refer a nondispositive motion to a 
magistrate judge “to hear and determine,” under subparagraph 
(A) of § 636(b)(1).  28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).1  Following a 
magistrate judge’s issuance of an order on a nondispositive 
matter, the parties may serve and file objections to the order 
within 14 days of being served with a copy of the order.  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 72(a).  If a party objects to a magistrate judge’s 
order regarding a nondispositive matter, the district court 
“must consider timely objections and modify or set aside any 
part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to 
law.”  Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).  This standard requires 
the District Court to review findings of fact for clear error and 
                                                          
1 Subparagraph (A) provides, in pertinent part:  
 
[A] judge may designate a magistrate judge to 
hear and determine any pretrial matter pending 
before the court, except a motion for injunctive 
relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for 
summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an 
indictment or information made by the 
defendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal 
case, to dismiss or to permit maintenance of a 
class action, to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted, and to 
involuntarily dismiss an action.  
 
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).  
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to review matters of law de novo.  Haines v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 
975 F.2d 81, 91 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
 If no party objects to the magistrate judge’s order 
regarding a nondispositive matter, the magistrate judge’s 
order becomes binding “unless the district court takes some 
action to overrule it.”  See United Steelworkers of Am. v. N.J. 
Zinc Co., 828 F.2d 1001, 1005 (3d Cir. 1987).  “[A] party’s 
failure to object to a magistrate’s ruling waives the party’s 
objection.”  Id. at 1006. 
 
2. 
 
 Under subparagraph (B), a district court may refer a 
dispositive motion to a magistrate judge “to conduct hearings, 
including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the 
court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the 
disposition.”  28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).2  The product of a 
                                                          
2 Subparagraph (B) provides:  
 
[A] judge may also designate a magistrate judge 
to conduct hearings, including evidentiary 
hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court 
proposed findings of fact and recommendations 
for the disposition, by a judge of the court, of 
any motion excepted in subparagraph (A), of 
applications for posttrial relief made by 
individuals convicted of criminal offenses and 
of prisoner petitions challenging conditions of 
confinement.  
 
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (footnote omitted).  
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magistrate judge, following a referral of a dispositive matter, 
is often called a “report and recommendation.”  Parties “may 
serve and file specific written objections to the proposed 
findings and recommendations” within 14 days of being 
served with a copy of the magistrate judge’s report and 
recommendation.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).  If a party objects 
timely to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the 
district court must “make a de novo determination of those 
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or 
recommendations to which objection is made.”  28 U.S.C. § 
636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).  If a party does 
not object timely to a magistrate judge’s report and 
recommendation, the party may lose its right to de novo 
review by the district court.  Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 194 
(3d Cir. 2007) (citing Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 
878–79 (3d Cir. 1987)).  However, we have held that because 
a district court must take some action for a report and 
recommendation to become a final order and because “[t]he 
authority and the responsibility to make an informed, final 
determination . . . remains with the judge,” Mathews v. 
Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 271 (1976), even absent objections to 
the report and recommendation, a district court should “afford 
some level of review to dispositive legal issues raised by the 
report,” Henderson, 812 F.2d at 878.  We have described this 
level of review as “reasoned consideration.”  Id.  If a party 
fails to object timely to the magistrate judge’s report and 
recommendation, we generally review the district court’s 
order for plain error.3  Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 
                                                                                                                                  
 
3 We have observed that “plain error review is so 
disadvantageous to the losing party that magistrate judges 
would be well advised to caution litigants that they ‘must 
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193 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara, 488 F.3d at 194.  But see Leyva v. 
Williams, 504 F.3d 357, 363–64 (3d Cir. 2007) (applying de 
novo appellate review when a pro se litigant did not timely 
object to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and 
the magistrate judge did not “warn[] that [the litigant’s] 
failure to object to the Magistrate Judge’s report would result 
in forfeiture of his rights”); Henderson, 812 F.2d at 878 n.4 
(“[W]hen the district court elects to exercise its power to 
review a magistrate’s report de novo, a party’s previous 
failure to object becomes irrelevant.”).  
 
B. 
 
 We now turn to the facts of our case.  As noted, the 
EEOC raises two interesting issues on appeal, one related to 
the exhaustion of administrative remedies and the second 
related to the disclosure of disciplinary and personnel records 
of a non-charging party to a charging party.  We will not, 
however, reach the substance of either issue because the 
District Court erroneously treated the motion to enforce as a 
nondispositive matter, as opposed to a dispositive matter, 
contrary to our holding in Frazier.  In Frazier, we held that 
because a proceeding to enforce an administrative subpoena 
“is over regardless of which way the court rules,” a motion to 
enforce an administrative subpoena is a dispositive motion.  
966 F.2d at 817–18.  Accordingly, any assignment of the 
                                                                                                                                  
seek review by the district court by filing [objections] within 
[14] days of the date of the [Report and Recommendation] 
with the Clerk of the district court and that failure to do so 
will waive the right to appeal.’”  Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 
F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011) (alterations in original) 
(quoting Siers v. Morrash, 700 F.2d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1983)).  
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motion by the District Court is governed by subparagraph 
(B), which requires the Magistrate Judge “to submit to a 
judge of the court proposed findings of fact and 
recommendations for the disposition.”  28 U.S.C. § 636 
(b)(1)(B).  Had the motion been so assigned, the parties could 
have objected to the report and recommendation, in which 
case the District Court would have reviewed their objections 
de novo, or they could have been silent as to objections, in 
which case the District Court would have “give[n] some 
reasoned consideration to the magistrate’s report before 
adopting it as the decision of the court.”  Henderson, 812 F.2d 
at 878.4   
 
 Here, the District Court’s erroneous categorization of 
the motion is compounded by the fact that the EEOC raised 
the disclosure issue, but not the exhaustion issue, to the 
District Court.5  As a result, the District Court, proceeding as 
                                                          
4 The District Court docket does not indicate whether the 
motion to enforce was referred to the Magistrate Judge under 
§ 636(b)(1)(A) or (B).  However, the Magistrate Judge styled 
her ruling as an order, not a report and recommendation, and 
did not warn the parties about the consequences of failing to 
object.  The order also directed the Clerk of the Court to 
“mark this case as closed,” App. 14, and the Clerk of Court 
thereafter terminated the case. 
 
5 The EEOC raised the exhaustion issue to the Magistrate 
Judge and to our Court, but it did not raise the issue to the 
District Court by objecting to the Magistrate Judge’s order.  
In contrast, the EEOC raised the disclosure issue to the 
Magistrate Judge, to the District Court (via objection to the 
Magistrate Judge’s order), and to our Court. 
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if the motion had been referred to the Magistrate Judge as 
nondispositive under subparagraph (A) of the Act, applied the 
clearly erroneous or contrary to law standard to the objected-
to disclosure issue and apparently did not review the 
unobjected-to exhaustion issue at all.   
 
 Because the District Court did not review the 
exhaustion issue, we will not consider it on appeal.  The 
District Court was obligated under Henderson, 812 F.2d at 
878, to review this issue even though it was not raised by the 
EEOC on appeal from the Magistrate Judge’s order.  In 
addition, we will not reach the disclosure issue because this 
issue will only be live if the District Court first concludes that 
Long Branch was not precluded from raising its defenses to 
the judicial enforcement of the subpoena.  In light of the fact 
that we do not know how the District Court will rule on the 
exhaustion issue, we will not review the disclosure issue at 
this juncture.6   
                                                          
6 While we do not definitively resolve the disclosure or 
exhaustion issues, we nevertheless will correct an 
unambiguous error of law in the framework employed by the 
District Court that has been briefed in this appeal and that, as 
a pure legal issue, would have been reviewed de novo 
regardless of the treatment of the enforcement motion as 
dispositive or nondispositive.  
 We believe that both the District Judge and Magistrate 
Judge misread the Supreme Court’s opinion in Associated 
Dry Goods as holding that a charging employee may not see 
investigative information obtained by the EEOC from other 
employees’ files.  To the contrary, the Court in Associated 
Dry Goods held that an employee filing a charge with the 
EEOC is not a member of the “public” to whom disclosure is 
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 Accordingly, we will vacate the order of the District 
Court and remand.  The District Court may consider the 
motion to enforce in the first instance or it may treat the 
Magistrate Judge’s order as a report and recommendation and 
allow the parties the opportunity to object.  See Mitchell v. 
Valenzuela, 791 F.3d 1166, 1174 (9th Cir. 2015) (remanding 
to the district court to “undertake . . . de novo review as to 
whether [a stay and abeyance] was warranted at the time of 
the magistrate judge’s order” and allowing the court to 
“consider the magistrate judge’s order on the stay as a report 
and recommendation, in which case the court should afford 
the parties an opportunity to lodge objections”); Flam v. 
Flam, 788 F.3d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 2015) (remanding to the 
district court to consider a motion to remand in the first 
                                                                                                                                  
prohibited.  See Assoc. Dry Goods, 449 U.S. at 600–03.  The 
limiting language upon which the District and Magistrate 
Judges relied refers to a situation in which multiple charging 
parties — such as multiple aggrieved employees — wish to 
obtain disclosure of evidence produced in each other’s cases, 
not in their own.  See id. at 603 (explaining that a charging 
party is not entitled to “know the content of any other 
employee’s charge,” such as when “other charging parties . . . 
have brought claims against the same employer” (emphasis 
added)).  
 Accordingly, should the District Court reach the 
disclosure issue on remand, it should both reconsider its 
reliance on Associated Dry Goods and, in determining 
whether limitations on disclosure are warranted, should 
utilize the framework for confidentiality orders that we 
articulated in EEOC v. Kronos, Inc., 620 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 
2010).  
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instance or to refer the motion to a magistrate judge for a 
report and recommendation). 
IV. 
 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will vacate the 
order of the District Court and remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.   
 
